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Abstract
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in the Great De-
pression of the 1930s. Among the diﬀering new interpretations, that of
the real business cycle (RBC) is particularly signiﬁcant. It represents
an outstanding methodological innovation in trying to cast the Great
Depression within an “equilibrium” framework. This paper critically
reviews the RBC interpretation of the Great Depression, clarifying its
theoretical and methodological foundations, and paving the way for
future assessments of its validity.
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1 Introduction
The Great Depression of the 30s was undoubtedly the most important eco-
nomic crisis ever witnessed by the XX century. Its extension and duration
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1convinced several contemporary observers that it might well be signalling the
approaching collapse of the capitalistic production system.
The Great Depression plays an outstanding role in the history of ideas.
Keynes’s General Theory, in eﬀect, dates back to 1936 and the Great De-
pression unquestionably paved the way to Keynes’ work. The Keynesian ap-
proach to the economic theory concentrates on the concept of market failure
as opposed to the standard laissez faire theory. Consequently, the experience
of the Great Depression seemed to conﬁrm, in the eyes of most contemporary
observers, the correctness of the Keynesian intuition, that, in the short run
at least, a capitalistic economy does not gravitate towards a full employment
position.
The Keynesian approach to economics remained the mainstream theory
until the end of the 1960s, when it was ﬁrst challenged by Friedman and the
monetarists, and subsequently replaced by new classical macroeconomics.
The main message put forward by this new trend in the economic litera-
ture, with particular regard to the history of economic thought, is that there
is no need for any “Keynesian” deviation from neoclassical theory in order
to provide a thorough explanation of the business cycle, as no market fail-
ure concept is required for this purpose. A properly deﬁned neoclassical
model could provide a plausible explanation of the phenomenon. Neverthe-
less, even when the Keynesian model lost its predominance and was replaced
by new classical macroeconomics, the Great Depression still appeared to be
an example of market failure, whose causes were mainly attributed to the
complex social and institutional situation after the World War I (Eichen-
green (1992); Kindleberger (1973)), and whose end could almost certainly
be ascribed to the intervention of public authorities (Romer (1992); Vernon
(1994)). New classical macroeconomists themselves considered the Great De-
pression a phenomenon somehow beyond the reach of equilibrium theory. In
particular, Lucas, whose distinctive contribution to economic theory consists
of having stated that all cycles were alike and could be studied as equilibrium
phenomena (Lucas 1977), wrote:
“the Great Depression [...] remains a formidable barrier to a
completely unbending application of the view that business cycles
are all alike.” (Lucas (1980), pg. 273.)
“If the Depression continues, in some respects, to defy ex-
planation by existing economic analysis (as I believe it does),
perhaps it is gradually succumbing under the Law of Large Num-
bers.” (Lucas (1980), pg.284)
However, at the end of the 1990s attempts to overcome this limitation
saw the light of day: a new interpretation of the Great Depression, which
2tried to explain it within a real business cycle (RBC) framework, began to
gain ground. Such an interpretation really constitutes a ﬁrst step in over-
coming the once accepted limit to equilibrium theory. Instead of viewing
the Great Depression as a phenomenon lying beyond the grasp of the equi-
librium discipline, authors working in this direction believe that the new
classical methodology and theory might be able to tackle it. To all intents
and purposes, this amounts to viewing the Great Depression as a “normal”
business cycle, in that, although exceptional in its dimension, it can be anal-
ysed within the new classical macroeconomics equilibrium framework.
In this paper I shall present a critical review of this RBC interpretation
of the Great Depression. The aim is to single out its theoretical and method-
ological foundations, so paving the way for assessing its validity. The paper
will be organised as follows. In Section 2, I shall explain some methodologi-
cal premises about the application of RBC theory to the Great Depression.
In Sections 3 and 4, a review of RBC existing papers about the US and the
International Great Depressions will be presented. In these review sections, a
narrative description of the models will be given with little or no recourse to
technicalities, although some details of the economic rationale behind them
will be explored. Section 5 summarises the argument, and provides guidelines
for future research.
2 The RBC Theory and the Great Depres-
sion: Assumptions and Methodology
2.1 Assumptions
The distinctive feature of RBC theory is its attempt to explain cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations of income and employment under two fundamental hypotheses, the
“equilibrium hypothesis” and the “exogenous shock hypothesis”.
The “equilibrium hypothesis” is the postulate that an economic cycle can
be studied as an equilibrium phenomenon, or, in other words, that it can be
studied in a framework comprising market clearing and agents’ optimising
behaviour (Lucas 1977). Under this assumption, business cycles are the
aggregate result of the optimum response of individuals to changes in the
economic environment (Hartley et al. (1997)). In Mankiw’s (1989) words
“[...] real business cycle theory describes economic ﬂuctuations
as a changing Walrasian equilibrium.”
I shall label as “exogenous shock hypothesis” the assumption that the source
3of the economic cycle is exogenous to the growth process1. In a RBC per-
spective, in fact, the economic cycle is conceived as a stochastic oscillation
around a trend which is determined by savings, demography and technol-
ogy, as in the Solow model (Solow (1956))2. This hypothesis characterises
the conception of the economic cycle within the RBC framework as due to
an exogenous shock to the fundamentals of an economic system, as opposed
to theories in which ﬂuctuations are endogenous, or to animal-spirit-driven
theories, in which ﬂuctuations result from the indeterminacy of the long-run
growth path3.
This conception of economic cycles has important implications for the
deﬁnition of depressions. Researchers in the RBC tradition deﬁne a depres-
sion as a period in which the rate of growth of the economy is suddenly and
signiﬁcantly below that which it would have been if the exogenous random
shock that hit the economy had never occurred. As to the notion of a Great
Depression, Kehoe and Prescott (2002) consider, as a “working deﬁnition”,
that a recession is a Great Depression if output falls cumulatively by more
than 20% with respect to its trend level, dropping by more than 15% in the
ﬁrst decade of the depression. These numbers serve to give a quantitative
deﬁnition of the borderline between a business cycle, and a business cycle
which has become a depression. Of course they imply a good dose of ar-
bitrariness, and although they may be reasonable, no theoretical meaning
should be attributed to them4.
1At a ﬁrst sight this labelling might seem to contrast with Plosser’s (1989) contention
that
[...] “The ﬂuctuations that are present in the model [...] are the result
of the same factors that generate economic growth. The real business cycle
model, therefore, provides an integrated approach to the theory of growth
and ﬂuctuations.”
But more in-depth consideration shows that the contrast is only apparent. The alleged
integration between growth theory and business cycle theory, which we will not discuss
here, does not mean that business cycles occur in a manner dependent on the process of
growth. On the contrary, in RBC models productivity ﬂuctuations occur exogenously at
random. Therefore the “exogenous shock hypothesis” label seems appropriate.
2For surveys on the RBC literature see, inter alia, Hartley et al. (1997), Mankiw
(1989), Plosser (1989), Ryan (2002) and Stadler (1994).
3Technically, in a standard RBC model the long-run growth path is a saddle-path with a
unique equilibrium, where convergence is guaranteed by the suitability of the production
and utility functions. To have ﬂuctuations, therefore, one needs a series of temporary
shocks to these functions. When animal spirits are considered, there is indeterminacy in
the equilibrium, and therefore convergence is not guaranteed anymore.
4Moreover these deﬁnitions produce some puzzling results. Kehoe and Prescott (2002)
argue that Switzerland has been experiencing a Great Depression since 1973, on the ground
that de-trended output per person of working age fell by more than 30% between 1973
4This deﬁnition amounts to considering that a Great Depression is a nor-
mal business cycle of greater magnitude, i.e. one in which the economic
aggregates behave as in any other business cycle, but with greater variance
in their oscillation.
2.2 The Dating of the Depression
It might be thought that the dating of the depression is an issue on which
consensus exists, yet this is not the case. As a matter of fact RBC theorists
have changed the way of thinking on this issue. Traditionally economists
tended to consider the Great Depression as starting with the stock market
crash of the 1929, and ending with the election of Roosevelt in the 1933
(Eichengreen (1992), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Robbins (1934), Temin
(1989))5. However in an RBC interpretation the Great Depression is deﬁned
as covering the entire decade of the 1930s. This results from the deﬁnition of
a Great Depression given above: US de-trended output dropped more than
35% in four years, while in 1939 it was nearly 27% below its 1929 de-trended
level (Cole and Ohanian (1999)). As Prescott (1999) points out, this change
in the timing of the event shifts the nature of the central question to be
addressed from
“Why was there such a big decline in output and employment
between 1929 and 1933?”
to
“Why did the economy remain so depressed for the entire decade?”
In other words, according to RBC theoreticians, a new issue should be added
to the “traditional” question of what caused the Great Depression, namely
what explains the slowness of the recovery phase. As a result, for them the
main aim of an economic explanation of the Great Depression becomes the
identiﬁcation of the obstacles, be they economic or socio-political, impeding
the recovery.
and 2000, with a decline of more than 18% between 1973 and 1983. Anyone can witness,
however, that life in Switzerland in the last 30 years has had very little in common with
life in the USA during the 1930s!
5Here I refer to the dating of the event called the “Great Depression”, not to the
dating of its alleged causes. In eﬀect, many of the authors quoted in the text consider the
causes of the Great Depression to be rooted in events which occurred well before 1929.
Eichengreen (1992) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) are an example. An exception to
this general tendency to date the Great Depression between 1929 and 1933 is Galbraith
(1995), who criticises this view from a Post-Keynesian point of view, asserting that the
Great Depression never ended, but was swept away by the outbreak of the second world
war.
52.3 Methodology
As to methodology, RBC theorists tread in Lucas’ footsteps by arguing that
the central purpose of a theory of the economic cycle is not to explain the
origin of a particular business cycle, but rather to make the artiﬁcial, mod-
elled economy reproduce the actual behaviour of a real-world economy (Lucas
(1980)). The logic of this methodological premise must be traced back to the
fundamental hypotheses we have singled out. Indeed, if any economic cycle
starts with an exogenous shock, studying the speciﬁc characteristic of this
shock serves little purpose for the task of elaborating a general theory of the
business cycle. It is much more important to understand the regularities that
will ensue after the shock occurs.
RBC theoreticians build models in the Solow-Ramsey tradition, modiﬁed
to allow for stochastic shocks that hit the economy at random. Any stochastic
shock of this nature is called an “impulse mechanism” of the business cycle.
The typical impulse mechanism considered in standard RBC models is a
technological shock, represented as an autoregressive stochastic shock on
the total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is a parameter of the production
function, which embodies a broad concept of eﬃciency in combining inputs to
obtain output. The point deserves closer examination, because RBC authors






where A = TFP. With a simple “growth accounting” exercise (Solow (1957))
we can distinguish between growth of output originated by the growth of
inputs, and the growth of output which can be attributed to variations in













The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the well-known Solow residual. In
a standard RBC model, the impulse mechanism of the business cycle is a
random shock on A of the kind
At = ρAt−1 + εt,
where 0 < ρ < 1 and εt’s are white-noise disturbances.
Having deﬁned the impulse mechanism of the business cycle, RBC theo-
reticians compute the equilibrium reaction to the impulse mechanism. That
is, they study the qualitative and quantitative response of the model economy
to the random shock, on the basis of the set of relationships postulated by
6the model which allows them to identify a “propagation mechanism” for the
shock. This simulation technique requires the model to be calibrated, that
is, a numerical value assigned to each parameter on the basis of econometric
estimates, or, if reliable econometric data are absent, on the basis of eco-
nomic plausibility. If the perturbed model economy “reproduces” aggregate
ﬂuctuations reasonably well, it can be considered as a plausible theory of the
cycle. That is, the ability of an artiﬁcial model to reproduce a set of stylised
facts after being hit by an exogenous random shock is the methodological
litmus test by which the robustness of the theory is judged.
2.4 National Dimension of the Phenomenon
The RBC interpretation of the Great Depression diﬀers from previous in-
terpretations when considering the role played by the international political
and economic environment during the 1930s. While earlier leading authors
(Bernanke (1995), Eichengreen (1992) and Kindleberger (1973)) had stressed
the international dimension of the Great Depression, and gone so far as to
say that a full understanding of that phenomenon could not be reached with-
out considering the international dimension, RBC researchers reversed this
position by concentrating their analysis on isolated country studies. Several
reasons may explain this change of perspective.
• The ﬁrst work on the Great Depression from a RBC perspective is the
paper by Cole and Ohanian (1999), which is strictly concerned with the
Great Depression in the USA. Data proves that the Great Depression
hit harder in the USA than in other industrialised countries; output
fell relatively more, and the state of depression of the economy lasted
longer than in any other country. This evidence persuaded the authors
to assume that the shock that aﬀected the US economy must have
been far bigger than the shocks which aﬀected other economies and,
in addition, that the slowness of the US recovery was probably due
to some idiosyncratic shock, since other countries recovered earlier.
Moreover, the USA is notoriously an almost closed economy as far as
international trade is concerned. Consequently, a national dimension
appears to them suﬃcient to analyse the US Great Depression6.
• From a methodological point of view, the mathematical formalisation
that is typical of RBC research forces the economist to leave out many
6This is the position held by Romer (1993) too. Although working from a diﬀerent
basis, she argues that the Great Depression in the United States was due to a mixture of
bad monetary policy and aggregate demand shocks, both with idiosyncratic characteristics
speciﬁc to the American case.
7aspects of reality in order to concentrate on the aspects that are con-
sidered essential. Given that RBC models explain recessions by means
of a shift in the labour-demand schedule (Mankiw (1989)), exogenous
shocks to TFP (i.e. exogenous variations in the Solow residual) could
easily do the job, while keeping the model suﬃciently compact. The
international dimension becomes therefore negligible.
3 The RBC Interpretation of the U.S. Great
Depression
The RBC interpretation of the US Great Depression stems from the work
of two leading authors, Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian. The initial results
were somewhat frustrating, insofar as neither the standard RBC story of
technological shocks, nor other standard real and monetary factors could
properly account for both the magnitude and the long duration of the Great
Depression. Therefore, they soon focused their attention on the protracted
character of the depression, a theme that eventually proved more congenial
to the RBC methodology and theory. The distorting elements of some New
Deal policies helped in explaining why the economy remained depressed for so
long. This position has been authoritatively espoused, not to say inspired7,
by Prescott, who, in a short comment article in 1999, gave a clever picture
of the basic elements of the RBC interpretation of the Great Depression.
3.1 The Early Stage: Cole’s and Ohanian’s Works,
Prescott’s Comment
3.1.1 The Onset of the Great Depression
Cole and Ohanian’s early work is mainly negative, consisting in showing
that earlier explanations of the Great Depression are unsatisfactory when
7See Prescott (1998), pg. 21.
“The Great Depression in the United States is an example of a large deviation
from the neoclassical growth theory that is not accounted for by variations
in TFP. In 1939 hours worded per adult were still 23% below what it was
in 1929, the year prior to the start of the Great Depression. During this ten
year period output per hour increased by about 10%, which is only a little
below the historical average. The question is why employment didn’t return
to its 1929 level. The only candidate for an answer is policy that changed
the nature of the game being played by the economic actors.”
8recast within the RBC framework. In their 1999 paper, the authors start by
describing the behaviour of the main de-trended macroeconomic aggregates
during the decade 1929-1939; subsequently, they try to single out, among the
many diﬀerent explanations in the literature purporting to explain business
cycles, the models which best ﬁt these data. Cole and Ohanian (1999) ﬁnd
that stochastic shocks to the growth rate of the TFP could explain roughly
40% of the 1929-1932 drop in output. They obtain this result by taking a
suitable speciﬁcation of the model, and feeding in the measured level of TFP
as a measure of technological shock.
An interesting point, highlighted later by Ohanian (2002), is that the
drop in measured TFP during the Great Depression, although not suﬃcient
to reproduce in the model the magnitude of the decline in output, is still rel-
atively high when compared with the drops in measured TFP that normally
accompany recessions in the post-World War II period. This feature means
that the behaviour of the TFP during the 1930s was peculiar, in that some of
the speciﬁc reasons had still to be discovered (see Ohanian (2002) for further
discussion).
Alternative “real” explanations, such as shocks to international trade,
public expenditure and distorting taxes, are presumed to have had a lesser
impact, if any, on the crisis. Their argument as to these alternative factors
is as follows.
International trade. The 1930s were characterised by the collapse of world
trade induced by the general raising of tariﬀs and quota restrictions.
Some authors (e.g. Crucini and Kahn (1996)) argue that this trade
disruption may have produced an appreciable eﬀect on the US econ-
omy, particularly if the elasticity of substitution between domestically
produced inputs and imported inputs was very low. Against this argu-
ment Cole and Ohanian (1999) note that the United States was at that
time a relatively closed economy, with trade comprising a relatively
low share, roughly balanced between imports and exports. Moreover,
the presence of tariﬀs suggests that, even if an important part of US
imports were intermediate goods, they probably had a high elasticity
of substitution with domestic intermediate goods; consequently, inter-
national trade disruptions probably had no appreciable or enduring
negative eﬀects on the US Great Depression.
Public expenditure and distorting taxes. Cole and Ohanian (1999) re-
port data showing that de-trended public expenditure in the USA de-
clined signiﬁcantly only in 1933. It remained above the trend level
during almost the entire decade. So a negative crowding out eﬀect of
public expenditure has to be dismissed. As far as taxes are concerned,
9the authors assert that tax rates on factors’ income changed slightly
in 1929-1933, but considerably more later on. Given the distorting na-
ture of income tax, it can be imagined that a tax increase may have
had some negative impact on the economy. Using data on the average
marginal tax rates on factors’ income, Cole and Ohanian (1999) run
two further simulations: the ﬁrst with the 1929 average tax level, the
second with the 1939 average tax level. In the second simulation the
steady-state level of labour input is 4% lower than in the ﬁrst. The
authors conclude that negative ﬁscal policy shocks did not produce ap-
preciable eﬀects on the 1929-1933 crisis, but they can explain some 20%
of the weak 1934-1939 recovery.
“Monetary” shocks, ﬁnancial disruptions and nominal rigidities are also
considered to have had little impact on the Great Depression.
The argument on this point is developed in detail by the same authors in
another paper (Cole and Ohanian (2000)), where a more in-depth view of the
role of deﬂation induced by monetary shocks in determining the 1929-1933
downturn within an RBC framework is provided. Cole and Ohanian (2000)
review the main mechanisms identiﬁed by economists to explain the observed
pattern of the real eﬀects of monetary policy during the 1930s, namely:
• Lucas and Rapping’s (1969) unexpected deﬂation model, by which an
unexpected monetary restriction would lead to a lower labour supply,
insofar as workers, having adaptive expectations, always expect that
the deﬂation of prices and monetary wages will no longer exist in the
next period, and they therefore respond to unexpected deﬂation by
lowering their labour supply;
• the debt deﬂation model of Irving Fisher (1933), by which deﬂation, by
making the burden of real debts heavier, would cause ﬁrms’ bankrupt-
cies, and a collapse in demand;
• the sticky wage hypothesis, by which, in the presence of nominal wage
rigidities, a general decrease in prices would induce an increase in real
wages, thus causing a decrease in the labour demand;
• theories centred on the role of banking disruptions induced by deﬂation,
that would have caused the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation to
decrease and a consequent decrease in lending and output (Bernanke
(1983)).
By comparing deﬂation in 1929-1933 to that in 1920-1921, the authors
ﬁrstly exclude Lucas and Rapping’s (1969) and Fisher’s (1933) hypotheses.
10To the ﬁrst they object that deﬂation was more likely to be expected in the
1930s than in the 1920s, because the nominal interest rate was lower during
the 1930s. This weakens Lucas and Rapping’s (1969) model propagation
mechanism, which is based on unexpected deﬂation. As to Fisher’s (1933)
debt-deﬂation model, they note that, although the level of private debt as a
proportion of output was higher in 1929 than in 1920, output dropped more
sharply during the 1930s than during the 1920s, even if deﬂation was less
severe8.
The strategy of comparing deﬂation in 1929-1933 and 1920-1921 is not
decisive as far as the sticky wage hypothesis and the ﬁnancial disruption
hypothesis are concerned. De-trended hourly real earnings in manufactur-
ing increased more in 1929-1933 than in the 1920-1921 recession, while bank
failures were certainly more widespread and signiﬁcant during the Great De-
pression. These considerations induced the authors to test these two hy-
potheses by means of simulations with modiﬁed versions of the benchmark
RBC model.
To test the sticky wage hypothesis, Cole and Ohanian (2000) built a two-
macro-sector general equilibrium model, in which a ﬁnal good Y is produced
by means of two diﬀerent types of intermediate goods Ym and Yn. Each
intermediate good is produced by means of capital and labour Hj, where
j = m,n. There are two sectors producing intermediate goods: one, n, is
a competitive sector, with wages set at the market clearing level; the other,
m, is a non-competitive sector, in that wages are ﬁxed above this market















Both capital and labour are immobile.
The preferences of the representative household are speciﬁed through a
logarithmic utility function. The representative household can allocate its
working time between the two sectors, and it is assumed to perceive that
wage ﬁxity in the non-competitive sector is a non-recurring phenomenon - i.e.
the model assumes that each wage shock occurring in any of the Depression
8Prices went down by 19.4% in 1920-22 and by 11.5% in 1929-31, whereas de-trended
real income dropped respectively by 3.8% in the 1920-22 and by 22.4% in the 1929-31. See
Cole and Ohanian (2000), pg. 6, Table 3.
11years is completely unexpected9.
The model is calibrated using, as far as possible, standard values from
RBC literature for the parameters. A calibration for the model-speciﬁc pa-
rameters is also provided. These parameters are φ (the parameter of the CES
production function, which governs the elasticity of substitution between Ym
and Yn) and α (the fraction of the economy distorted by high wages). The
values of these parameters are chosen by considering the manufacturing sec-
tor as the empirical counterpart of the non-competitive sector in the model.
The authors run two simulations, one with a benchmark model without
nominal wage rigidities, and another with the model as described above.
They then compare the results of their simulations with the data, and con-
clude:
“These results suggest that the high wage was not the primary
cause of the Great Depression.[...] This wage accounts for about
a 3 per cent decline in output at the trough of the Great Depres-
sion, compared to an actual 38 per cent decline. Increasing the
size of the distorted sector to 50 per cent, or reducing the sub-
stitution elasticity to 0,1 did not signiﬁcantly change the result.”
(Cole and Ohanian (2000) pg. 20).
The economic rationale of this result is as follows. In this two-sector
model, wage rigidity has both a direct and an indirect eﬀect on employment.
In the distorted sector ﬁrms employ labour up to the point where the marginal
product of labour equates to the real wage. Because, by deﬁnition, the real
wage in this sector is above the market clearing level, production in the
distorted sector will be below its potential level. It follows that part of
the labour force potentially employable in the distorted sector will remain
unemployed. Such a direct eﬀect is clearly negative. To understand the
indirect eﬀect, it is worth considering that output in the distorted sector
is an input in the production of the ﬁnal good. Cole and Ohanian (2000)
assume that technology is such that Ym and Yn are imperfect complements in
the production of the ﬁnal good, rather than substitutes. That is to say they
consider φ < 0. This means that as Ym diminishes, its relative scarcity will
increase, and so will do its relative demand. Firms cannot substitute Yn for
Ym beyond a certain level. Thus
pm
pn , the relative price of the distorted sector,
must increase. According to the authors, this means that, given a monetary
wage ¯ wm, the real wage ¯ wm
pm should decrease. In other words, the real wage
would decrease in spite of the nominal rigidity, thus determining an upward
9This is a technical assumption needed in order to be able to compute the equilibrium
in the simulation recursively.
12shift in the value of marginal product of labour (i.e. the marginal product of
labour multiplied by the price of output schedule). Thus the indirect eﬀect
would tend to counteract the direct one.
Cole-Ohanian (2000) also exclude the possibility that wages might be
signiﬁcantly underestimated, and instead argue that the contrary is likely to
be true. They refer to Margo (1993) and assert that wages were probably
well below the trend line also in the manufacturing sector, because of the
compositional bias in favour of high-skilled workers that aﬀected the U.S.
economy in the 30s10.
As to the analysis of banking shocks, Cole and Ohanian (2000) ﬁrst de-
ﬁned banking shocks as bank closures aﬀecting the information capital. Af-
terwards they built a model in which information capital was used by banks
as input together with deposits, to obtain a “banking output”. This banking
output appears, in the end, as an input for the production of the ﬁnal good.
Both these productive process are assumed to be constant returns to scale.
This model was built so that, in each sector, the ratio of inputs to outputs
is equal for all inputs. Consequently, the loss of information capital relative
to output due to bank closures is equal to the fraction of deposits on output
loss due to bank closures. As, on the basis of the US data reported by Cole
and Ohanian (1999), this was pretty low during the Great Depression, the
authors conclude that, because the loss of information capital was also low
during the Great Depression, it only aﬀected the economy slightly.
3.1.2 The Long Duration of the Great Depression
While, as we have seen, the results of Cole and Ohanian’s analysis of the
onset of the Great Depression were basically negative, its long duration pro-
vided them with more encouraging results. Had the Great Depression been
a normal business cycle, it should have ended much earlier than it actually
did. Once the eﬀects of the TFP negative shock were exhausted, the economy
should have recovered its steady-state growth path. In Cole and Ohanian’s
(1999) simulations, output should have recovered its trend level by 1936, if
the measured shocks to TFP in the 1930s had been the sole ”impulse mech-
anism” for the economic cycle. The TFP was back to its trend level in that
year. However de-trended data show that in 1939 output was still a good
25% below its trend level. The observation that the recovery failed to hap-
pen in the mid-1930s led Cole and Ohanian (1999) to argue that the Great
Depression was not only the result of a temporary shock that caused a ﬂuc-
tuation around the trend-growth path, but that it was probably the outcome
10This point is actually controversial. For instance, Bordo et al. (2000) argue that data
at the industrial level suggest that there was no signiﬁcant skill composition bias.
13of a mixture of a temporary shock with some other permanent shocks that
caused the growth path itself to shift downward. At the end of their paper,
Cole and Ohanian (1999) suggest that a likely culprit could be the New Deal
policies introduced after 1933.
While this line of research about the link between New Deal policies and
the Great Depression is only alluded to in Cole and Ohanian’s 1999 paper, it
is the central object of their subsequent research (Cole and Ohanian (2004)
and, in an earlier and more detailed working paper version, Cole and Ohanian
((2001)). Their basic claim is that New Deal competition and labour market
policies are to blame for the duration of the Great Depression. In particular,
they consider two important reforms: the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA)11 and the National Labour Relations Act (NLRA)12. These measures
had a relatively high coverage in the economy: employment in the sectors
covered by the NIRA was about 52% of total employment, while this ﬁgure
reached 77% in the private non-farm sector (Cole and Ohanian (2001), pg.
67, Table 2). Cole and Ohanian (2004) built a model to show that the rise
in prices and wages actually curbed the recovery in production, rather then
boosting it (as Roosevelt’s economic advisers had thought it would)13. The
11The NIRA was enacted in 1933 and declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in 1935. The act aimed at providing all the sectors covered by “codes of fair competition”,
to obtain an end to substantial price deﬂation, and an increase in workers’ income that
could allow for greater consumption expenditure. The NIRA also suspended anti-trust
law, and encouraged cooperation between ﬁrms, and collusion in price setting; it heavily
discouraged price competition, subordinating price cuts to administrative approval. The
codes, though diﬀerent for each sector, had to be negotiated under the guidance of the
National Recovery Administration, and required the approval of the President. Cole and
Ohanian (2001) stress that Roosevelt’s political inclinations, as well as the deep conviction
of his advisers that an increase in prices and nominal wages would be the best way to
counteract the depression, led him to guarantee his approval to those codes that included
collective bargaining over wages and minimum wages for low-skilled workers.
12The NLRA was enacted in 1935, and its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1937. It gave workers the right to organise themselves into trade unions indepen-
dent of their masters; it prohibited discrimination based upon union aﬃliation, as well as
the coercive enrolment in companies’ unions. The Act also established a National Labour
Relations Board (NLRB), which had the authority to guarantee the legal enforcement of
wage agreements.
13It is very interesting to note that the view that the NIRA policy probably had a
negative impact is not the prerogative of RBC theory. J.M. Keynes, in an open letter
to Roosevelt published in The New York Times in 1933, expressed his disagreement with
this policy as a means of producing a recovery. He argued that the fact that an increase
in prices and monetary wages generally characterises the recovery periods does not mean
that it causes the recovery to happen. So, in Keynes’s view, the US administration had
confused causes with eﬀects. In Keynes’s opinion the NIRA was probably an obstacle to
recovery, because it increased the costs of production, whereas the appropriate measure
14model is explicitly oversimpliﬁed insofar as it assumes NIRA and NLRA to be
the same thing, and does not consider the eﬀects of other New Deal policies.
This is done in order to have only one model, which could more easily be
used to predict output in the whole 1934-1939 period.
The benchmark speciﬁcation of the model is a multi-sector version of a
standard real business cycle model, in which a ﬁnal good in period t, Yt, is
produced using a variety of intermediate goods. These intermediate goods
are produced by diﬀerent industries, i ∈ [0,1], each belonging to a sector
s ∈ [1,S]. The set of industries in sector s is given by [ϕs−1,ϕ], where ϕs ∈
[0,1] and ϕs−1 < ϕs, ϕ0 = 0, and ϕs = 1. All the production technologies
exhibit constant returns to scale. In algebraic form, denoting the output of
the industry i as y(i), the labour augmenting technology in the industry as
z, the sectoral output as Ys,t, and assuming perfectly mobile labour across

























t−1 [ln(ct) + φln(1 − nt)],
in which nt is the number of members of a household working in the market
- i.e. labour is assumed to be indivisible.
To model New Deal policies in this setup, Cole and Ohanian modify the
model in three ways.
First, they assume that, in the economy, a fraction χ of the sectors pro-
ducing intermediate goods forms a cartel. In these sectors there is, therefore,
a rent to be shared between workers and ﬁrms arising from the monopolistic
extra proﬁts.
for ending the recession was a policy of large government expenditure, ﬁnanced by long-
term public debt, together with a monetary policy which ﬁxed low nominal interest rates.
Keynes’s diagnosis was that people were not spending money, and that this was causing
the cumulative deﬂation that resulted in depression. To restart a virtuous circle of devel-
opment, people had to be induced to spend. If this were not possible, a good surrogate
for the missing private expenditure would be government expenditure. In the end, the
increase in the aggregate demand would generate an increase in the general level of prices.
15Second, Cole and Ohanian assume that, as a consequence, wages in these
cartelised sectors are bargained over between workers and ﬁrms; the relative
bargaining power of the two parties is embodied in a parameter ω that gives
the probability of a ﬁrm gaining monopolistic extra proﬁts without accepting
workers’ wage demands. The cartelised sector behaves as in an “insider-
outsider” model, where all insider workers are paid the same wage.
Third, it is assumed that there are frictions on the labour market, in order
to allow for ﬂows of workers between the competitive and the cartelised sec-
tors. This is modelled by saying that a fraction π of workers in the cartelised
sector in period t will keep their jobs in period t + 1, while a fraction 1 − π
will lose them due to retirement, illness, etc. Considering that jobs in the
cartelised sectors are better paid, workers’ preferences will certainly be to
move to these sectors rather than to similar jobs in the competitive sectors.
Consequently, a search process for these jobs will start. Cole and Ohanian
assume that a person searching for a job in a cartelised sector in period t will
ﬁnd it in period t + 1 with probability vt.
These three modiﬁcations are intended to emphasise the characteristics
of the New Deal policies the authors consider essential, i.e. the connection
between the acceptance of collective bargaining, allowing de facto for the
greater bargaining power of unions and workers, and allowing a price control
policy by cartelised ﬁrms. They also reproduce the “equal pay for equal
work” principle, a cornerstone of union policy in the 1930s. Cole and Ohanian
(2004) calibrate and simulate their model, feeding in the sequence of observed
TFP as measures of the technological shock, and then compare the results
of the cartel modiﬁcation with the competitive benchmark, both in relative
terms and in terms of reproducing the actual data.
The main result they obtain when comparing the two steady-state solu-
tions is that cartelisation policy causes a greater drop in output, the greater
the bargaining power of workers, i.e. the lower is the calibrated value for the
parameter ω, and, ceteris paribus, the higher is χ, the share of the economy
involved in such a policy. However the eﬀects of varying ω are much larger
than those induced by variation in χ; as Cole and Ohanian observe:
“The key depressing element of the policy is not monopoly per
se, but rather the link between wage bargaining and monopoly.”
(Cole and Ohanian (2004), pg. 805).
As far as comparison with the actual data is concerned, while the competitive
model does not at all reproduce the observed trend of the economic aggregates
during the recovery, the cartel model (obviously starting from the same initial
value for the capital stock, and feeding in the same sequence of TFP) makes
predictions which are considerably closer to the facts. On the basis of the
16ﬁgures obtained, Cole and Ohanian (2004) argue that the cartel model is
able to explain a good 60% of the slow recovery. The rationale for this result
is that the negative eﬀects of higher wages and lower production propagate
from the cartelised sectors to the competitive ones, insofar as the reduced
output in the cartelised sectors tends to lower wages and employment in the
competitive sectors where, moreover, people search for a more rewarding job
in the cartelised sectors. So, they conclude,
“[...] New Deal labor and industrial policies did not lift the econ-
omy out of the Great Depression [...] Instead, the joint policies
of increasing labor’s bargaining power, and linking collusion with
paying high wages, prevented a normal recovery by creating rents
and an ineﬃcient insider-outsider friction that raised wages signif-
icantly and restricted employment.” (Cole and Ohanian (2004),
pg. 813).
3.1.3 Prescott’s Assessment
In a short comment article on Cole and Ohanian (1999), Prescott (1999)
sketches a general and clear outline of the RBC interpretation of the US
Great Depression, which is worth considering. It can be brieﬂy summarised
as follows. First, some of the exogenous factors described in terms of an
exogenous shock to TFP would necessarily have caused a strong recession
at the end of 1929. Second, misconceived economic policies, attempting to
improve the disastrous economic performance of that time, impeded the nor-
mal adjustment of market forces. These policies introduced strong distorting
elements into the US economy: by increasing de jure the real wage rate, they
lowered the normal employment level and the growth path. In Prescott’s
(1999) words:
“in the Great Depression, employment was not low because in-
vestment was low. Employment and investment were low because
labour market institutions and industrial policies changed in a
way that lowered normal employment.” (Prescott (1999), pg.
27).
The methodological perspective that lies behind this paper deserves to be
discussed, because it is representative of the whole early RBC interpretation
of the Great Depression. Prescott (1999) seems to draw a line between the
realm of history, which includes the historical identiﬁcation of shocks, and the
realm of economics, which studies the propagation mechanism of the business
cycle. If I am correct, in this methodological approach the origin of a shock
17(i.e. the concrete historical determination of the impulse mechanism of the
business cycle) is outside the scope of economics, being somehow banished
into the limbo of anecdotal report. This procedure might make sense, from
a theoretical point of view, when the development of a general theory of the
business cycle is considered. In that case, the theory can conceivably be more
interested in the regularities of the business cycle (that is, in how a business
cycle arises from an exogenous shock) than in studying the peculiarities of
each particular shock. However things should be diﬀerent when a speciﬁc
analysis, such as the Great Depression, is considered. All the more that in
this case the exogenous shock required to reproduce the data is abnormally
large, and this abnormal dimension deserves more detailed historical analysis.
Subsequent RBC analyses have indeed involved more causal perspectives.
3.2 Subsequent Developments
3.2.1 The Debate about Sticky Wages
Cole and Ohanian’s (2000) conclusions that sticky wages were irrelevant in
accounting for the onset of the US Great Depression have been questioned
by other RBC authors. Christiano et al. (2004) point out that
“there just does not seem to be a tight negative relationship be-
tween the real wage on the one hand, and output and employment
on the other”.
Other authors have put forward counter-arguments. Bordo et al. (2001)
and Gertler (2001) argue that what Cole and Ohanian (2000) call the “the
general equilibrium” indirect eﬀect of wage rigidity, in a two-sector model,
is actually a biased result. According to them, Cole and Ohanian’s (2000)
result follows from the unjustiﬁed assumption of perfect wage ﬂexibility in the
non-manufacturing sector. As Gertler (2001) points out, this model excludes
nominal wage rigidity by deﬁnition, and thus excludes the decrease in the
aggregate demand for labour that is necessary if the sticky wage hypothesis
is to produce real eﬀects. Moreover, Bordo et al. (2001) emphasise that there
is no justiﬁcation for this choice, either theoretical or empirical, because it
is based on a questionable extension to the whole non-manufacturing sector
of the wage ﬂexibility observed in the farming sector. According to Bordo
et al. (2001), imposing a non-competitive wage in the non-manufacturing
sector - even lower, if so we wish, than the non-competitive wage in the
manufacturing sector - completely reverses Cole and Ohanian (2000) results.
Empirical evidence on cross-sectional international data presented by
Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) suggests that currency-devaluating countries
18experienced relatively lower real wages and higher industrial production, a
ﬁnding consistent with the sticky wage hypothesis14.
Finally, on the positive side, Bordo et al. (2000) show that the sticky
wage hypothesis could provide a ﬁtting explanation of the onset of the Great
Depression, within a RBC framework. In this paper, the authors build a sim-
ple one-sector real business cycle model with ﬁxed wages ` a la Taylor (1980)
and monetary shocks. Running a simulation on this model, they ﬁnd that
the model can “explain” approximately 70% of the 1929-1932 drop in out-
put, a result in sharp contrast with Cole and Ohanian (2000). However,
they do admit that their results clearly show that on its own the sticky wage
hypothesis accounts neither for the recovery phase of the US Great Depres-
sion, characterised by a strong monetary expansion (Romer (1992)), nor for
the ﬁnal year of the recession, 1932-1933. Bordo et al. admit that some
ﬁnancial disruption of the kind envisaged by Bernanke (1983) might have
been responsible for the crisis in the ﬁnal year, whereas they suggest a more
detailed explanation, built on Cole and Ohanian’s (1999) early suggestion
about the possible distorting role of New Deal policies to explain the recov-
ery phase. In particular, they focus on the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA), a step that was taken a year later by Cole and Ohanian. Bordo et al.
(2000) then modify the process of wage formation in their model by splitting
it into two processes: a Taylor setting, for the period 1929:3-1933:215; and a
level of wages ﬁxed to their 1933:2 level later on. This modiﬁed model shows
that
“As long as real wages were legislatively mandated at levels well
above the marginal product of labour that would prevail at full
employment, monetary expansion alone could not lead to recov-
ery.”
The lack of unanimity among RBC authors about the role played by
wage stickiness in the onset of the Great Depression is worth stressing. To
all intents and purposes, this lack of unanimity suggests that the theoretical
quantitative approach of RBC can lead to equivocal conclusions.
3.2.2 Christiano et al. (2004)
A further development in the application of RBC methodology to the Great
Depression is the recent work by Christiano et al. (2004). This paper is
14Expansionary monetary policy generates price inﬂation; provided that nominal wages
are rigid, real wages will go down. This will determine an increase in labour demand and
hence in output.
15Quarterly data are used here.
19actually an attempt to build a “realistic” dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model that can be used for contemporary policy questions. The US
Great Depression appears in the paper as the toughest possible test for the
model. In this respect Christiano et al.’s basic conclusions is that while the
Great Depression was certainly the result of many joint shocks, it is mainly
attributable to two factors: a “preference for liquidity shock” (which induced
a shift away from demand deposit towards money, thus in large part caus-
ing the onset of the depression); and the increased market power of workers
during the New Deal (which explains why, during the recovery phase, em-
ployment was still so low, thereby shedding some light on why the recovery
phase itself was so slow).
These results are obtained by means of a very complex RBC style model.
Its basic structure is as follows. It is assumed that a ﬁnal good Yt is produced
by a perfectly competitive representative ﬁrm, by means of a number of inter-
mediate goods Yj,t. These intermediate goods are produced by monopolists
who set their prices Pj,t subject to a Calvo (1983) style friction. The interme-
diate good ﬁrms need labour lj,t and capital Kj,t for their productive activity.
They buy working hours from households, paying a wage rate Wt. They rent
capital from entrepreneurs, paying a rental price of capital Prk
t for capital
services. Moreover, each intermediate good ﬁrm must ﬁnance in advance a
fraction ψk and ψl of capital and labour services. They do it by asking for
loans from banks, and paying back a net interest rate of Rt. Entrepreneurs
buy capital x from capital producers, paying for it at the price Q ¯ K0,t. In
order to pay these amounts they use their net worth Nt and they borrow
Bt = Q ¯ K0,t − Nt from banks, paying a gross interest rate Zt. At the end of
the period, they sell back the undepreciated capital to capital producers, at
the same price Q ¯ K0,t.
Entrepreneurs can be bankrupted during each period with a probabil-
ity 1 − γt, which is also the fraction of the new entrepreneurs entering the
market. Capital producers produce units of new capital good x0 by means
of previously installed capital x and investment goods It. They buy invest-
ment goods from the ﬁnal good sector, paying them Pt. Banks use capital
and labour to “produce” their services and hoard reserves. They buy work-
ing time lb
t from household, and rent capital Kb
t from entrepreneurs, paying
respectively Wt and Prk




t , paying them an interest rate of Ra,t. They also hold time
deposits from households, Tt, which pay a non-state-contingent expected rate
of return Re
t+1.
Finally, households consume an amount Ct of the ﬁnal good, paying Pt
per unit; they hold high powered money Mb; they pay lump-sum transfers
to entrepreneurs, in order to guarantee free entry in entrepreneurship; and
20receive lump-sum transfers corresponding to the net worth of entrepreneurs
exiting the economy.
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,
where −bCt+l−1 represents habit persistence; ζt+l is a parameter denoting
a shock to the preference for leisure; vt stands for the liquidity preference
shock. Households are assumed to be able to exert some monopoly power
over labour, so that they set wages within a Calvo contract setting. There
is also a non-modeled Government, which buys Gt unit of the ﬁnal good, at
the price of Pt per unit.
Christiano et al. (2004) then introduce eight exogenous shocks and study
their joint and idiosyncratic impact on the model, comparing outcomes with
data for the US Great Depression. These shocks aﬀect: the monopoly power
of intermediate good ﬁrms (λf,t); the monopoly power of wage earners (ζt);
households’ preference for currency versus demand for deposits (θt); the pref-
erence for liquidity (vt); productivity shocks for intermediate goods (εt); the
survival probability of the entrepreneur (γt); the relative value of excess re-
serve in banking sector (ξt); willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks (σt).
These shocks are drawn from stochastic processes, and estimated with a
maximum likelihood procedure.
Christiano et al. assume that these shocks inﬂuence the rate of growth
of money, because of the monetary authority reaction function. After having
estimated all the parameters and calibrated the model, they ran a simulation,
ﬁtting in the estimated values for the shocks. They found that their model
could properly reproduce key features of the data. As anticipated in the
beginning of this section, they also found that two shocks were crucial in
explaining the Great Depression in the United States: preference for liquidity
and workers’ market power.
While workers’ market power resembles the traditional high wages story,
which we have dealt with above, the preference for liquidity deserves some
further explanation. An exogenous shock to the preference for liquidity leads




in consumption and in time deposits. The aggregate M1 falls, causing the
interest rates to increase. The higher interest rates, causing an increase in the
debt burden and a decrease in the rental price of capital16, lead to a higher
16Because consumption demand decreases.
21probability of bankruptcy for entrepreneurs. As a consequence, entrepreneurs
drop their demand for capital goods, and therefore capital producers lower
the level of production of capital goods. Their prices, therefore, go down.
The fall in the price of capital worsens the drop in investments, because it
causes the net worth of entrepreneurs to diminish.
At the end of the paper, Christiano et al. (2004) carried out a coun-
terfactual example in which monetary authority actively reacts against the
shocks, allowing the growth rate in the monetary base to overcompensate for
the reduction due to the eight shocks. This leads them to argue that, had
an appreciably more expansive monetary policy taken place in the 1930s, the
size and duration of the Great Depression would have been much less.
This study by Christiano et al. (2004) is methodologically analogous to
the previous studies reviewed. The analysis is, however, somewhat more
complex, because of the attempt to take into account at least some of the
complexity of reality. Its conclusions are clear as well as its policy impli-
cations: the Great Depression was in origin a “market failure” due to an
escape towards liquidity, worsened later on by the distorting intervention of
the State. Then a “State failure” was added to the ongoing crisis. Had there
been an active monetary policy, the depression would have been milder.
3.2.3 Weder (2001)
The last paper to be considered in this section is Weder’s (2001). In this
paper, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the RBC type is
modiﬁed in order to allow exogenous shocks to the aggregate demand for
consumption to be the only impulse mechanism of the business cycle. The
aim of this paper is to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the consumption
shock on the Great Depression by simulating the model. As for the method-
ological concern, the model is in the RBC tradition. Nevertheless, it has a
clearly Keynesian ﬂavour, all the more so in that Weder deﬁnes his model as
a RBC formalisation of Temin’s (1976) ideas on the Great Depression as a
phenomenon mainly due to a contraction of the autonomous components of
aggregate demand for consumption.









t[(1 − η)ln(ct − ∆t) + η ln(1 − lt)],
where ∆t is a random variable aﬀecting the subsistence level of consumption,
and lt stands for labour. The model also includes variable capital utilization
22ut, “organizational synergies” At and increasing returns to scale, expressed







At = (¯ ut ¯ kt)
α¯ lt
(1−α).
Weder (2001) identiﬁes the preference shifter econometrically as follows.
He ﬁrst derives a Euler equation from the ﬁrst order conditions for the house-
hold’s utility maximisation problem. He then linearises the Euler equation,
taking a Taylor approximation of it. Finally uses ordinary least squares to
regress the formula he obtained on the data, and takes the residual from the
regression as the preference shifter. The dynamic process of this preference
shifter is then found econometrically to be second order autoregressive, of
the kind
ˆ ∆t = ζ1 + ζ2t + ζ3 ˆ ∆t−1 + ζ4 ˆ ∆t−2 + dt.
Weder uses this AR(2) to compute a shock series {dt}1939
1930 from the data.
Then, he calibrates his model, largely on the basis of Cole-Ohanian (1999)
analysis, and runs a simulation. It turns out that the model with increasing
returns matches the trend in US output very well, “explaining” around 82%
of the collapse, the slow recovery and the second 1937 recession.
Weder (2001) is also interested in comparing his model with both the
competitive and the cartel model in Cole and Ohanian (2001). He ﬁrst points
out that his model can mimic the onset of the Great Depression as well as
the slowness of the recovery (reproducing about 80% of the data), whereas
Cole and Ohanian’s (2001) competitive model can explain only about 40% of
the onset of the depression, and very little of the recovery phase. Moreover
Cole and Ohanian’s (2001) cartel model can only explain a 50-60% of the
recovery phase. Besides, Weder argues that his model can reproduce the
1937 recession, which other models cannot.
To investigate further which model “explains” data in a statistically more
appropriate way, Weder (2001) runs a regression of actual US output on the
“predicted” output of three models: his own model, Cole and Ohanian’s
(2001) competitive model and Cole and Ohanian’s (2001) cartel model. He
ﬁnds that the “predictions” of his model are statistically more signiﬁcant
than those of the other two models. Indeed, when output from his model
is added to the regression, the other two lose any explanatory power, in the
sense that the null hypothesis (that they do not explain US output at all)
cannot be rejected. When only the recovery period is considered, his model
and Cole and Ohanian’s cartel model) are equally statistically signiﬁcant in
“explaining” the data.
23This apparent equivalence in data mimicking ability between two concep-
tually diﬀerent hypotheses (shocks on productivity and institutional modiﬁ-
cations - i.e. supply shocks - in Cole and Ohanian (1999) and (2001), and
shocks on the aggregate demand in Weder (2001)) raises doubts about the
usefulness of RBC methodology as applied to the interpretation of an histori-
cal event such as the Great Depression. As a matter of fact, RBC theory does
not provide a criterion to choose between contrasting explanations that have
the same data mimicking ability. In the case under examination, therefore,
the results are ﬁnally ambiguous, despite the valuable quantitative eﬀort.
3.3 A General Picture
When assessing the RBC model, Romer (2001) makes a distinction between
real business cycle models, and real-business-cycle-style models. The former
refer to
“[...] the proposition that macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are well
described by a model where aggregate technology shocks and
other real disturbances impinge on a Walrasian economy [...].”
The latter are deﬁned as models working in the RBC methodological tradi-
tion, but employing a wide range of non-Walrasian ingredients17. The idea
behind this distinction is that
“[...] What distinguishes the real-business-cycle research pro-
gram is its approach to modelling.”
Using a slight reinterpretation of this deﬁnition, I will distinguish between a
RBC-proper interpretation of the Great Depression and a RBC-style inter-
pretation of the Great Depression.
The RBC-proper interpretation (including Cole and Ohanian (1999), (2000),
(2001), (2004) and Prescott (1999)), sticks strictly to the standard RBC
methodology, insofar as no causal explanation is involved. In this inter-
pretation, the explanation of the plunge of the early thirties (that is, the
historical identiﬁcation of the shock that caused the Great Depression) is
somehow considered methodologically less interesting than the explanation
of the long duration of the depression (that is, why the Great Depression
did not behave in the same way as business cycles observed in the post-war
period). This attitude comes from considering the Great Depression as a
17This deﬁnition amounts to saying that Romer (2001) deﬁnes RBC-style models as
basically those belonging to the stream of literature nowadays known as new neoclassical
synthesis (Goodfriend and King (1997)).
24normal business cycle, one in which aggregate economic variables behave as
in any other business cycle, but for the magnitude of the oscillations. As
a consequence of this methodological perspective, the causes of the produc-
tive collapse of the USA economy in the 1930s are mostly traced back to
some exogenous supply shock, embodied for simplicity in a parameter of the
production function (i.e. TFP). As for the protracted character of the depres-
sion, the RBC-proper interpretation charges New Deal policies with having
been responsible for it. These policies allowed for substantial distortions in
the economy, thus impeding the otherwise inevitable recovery.
The RBC-style interpretation, in which I include all the other papers re-
viewed above, follows methodologically in the wake of the RBC tradition,
while trying to deviate from the benchmark RBC model, by looking for ex-
planations of the onset of the Great Depression. In other words, this current
in the literature is interested in a causal perspective, the onset of the Great
Depression being explained by means of a variety of explicit variables (mon-
etary shocks and sticky wages in Bordo et al. (2000); preference for liquidity
in Christiano et al. (2004); exogenous demand shocks in Weder (2001)).
As to the long duration of the Great Depression, all these authors accept
the implications of the “normality view”: either the Great Depression would
have been a normal business cycle of higher magnitude, had distorting State
interventions been absent (Bordo et al. (2000), Christiano et al. (2004)); or
the Great Depression was a normal business cycle of higher magnitude that
lasted a long time because the shock producing the cycle was extremely long
lasting (Weder (2001)).
The general picture that emerges from this survey stands in sharp contrast
to the views held by previous economic historians. Eichengreen and Temin
(2000) are authoritative representatives of these views. They stress the role
of Gold Standard policies and mentality in causing the onset of the Great
Depression and its widespread diﬀusion around the world. The historical
analysis tends to consider the Great Depression as a speciﬁc outcome of many
historically speciﬁc causes; it does not share the “normality” perspective at
all.
Two aspects of this RBC literature on the Great Depression seem partic-
ularly worthy of comment: the methodological and the normative aspects.
Methodologically, it emerges from the survey of the literature (above) that
the early RBC authors could be interpreted as erecting a border line between
the realms of history and economics. Economics was basically concerned
with the elaboration of models trying to reproduce a given set of data by the
endogenous model’s response to an unidentiﬁed exogenous shock. On the
contrary, history had the role of giving both content and meaning to the ex-
ogenous shock. As already discussed, this methodological perspective, while
25being perhaps appropriate when building a general theory of the business
cycle, leaves many problems unresolved when dealing with the speciﬁc case
of the interpretation of an historical event such as the Great Depression. All
the more so in that, in the case under consideration, the exogenous TFP
shock explaining the onset of the Great Depression is not satisfactory: while
it explains only 40% of the contraction phase (Cole and Ohanian (1999)),
TFP’s drop is abnormally large when compared with TFP’s behaviour in
the post-war era (Ohanian(2002)). This methodological aspect is somehow
smoothed over in later RBC-style interpretations.
A striking aspect of the application of RBC methodology to the Great
Depression is that sometimes such a methodology leads to an ambiguous
results, as happens, for example, when dealing with the sticky wages story
(Bordo et al. (2000) vs. Cole and Ohanian (2000)) or in the case of the quan-
titative equivalence between demand-shock-driven and supply-shock-driven
explanations of the Great Depression (Weder (2001) vs. Cole and Ohanian
(2004)). This point deserves some attention because the quantitative dimen-
sion of RBC theory has always been thought of, by its proponents, as one of
the major strengths of RBC methodology, as it allows for the comparative
evaluation of diﬀerent theories on a quantitative basis. This has been a big
step forward in economic theory. It was thought that the theoretician anal-
yses each hypothesis by means of a benchmark model, and then chooses the
one that best ﬁts the data, after having simulated the model. The ambiguous
results reported here for the Great Depression, instead, suggest that RBC
methodology does not always provide suitable criteria for choosing among
competing theories.
As far as the normative aspect is concerned, there is widespread agree-
ment among RBC authors on the negative impact of New Deal policies,
which are seen as causing the exceedingly long duration of the Great De-
pression. This position reﬂects the general pro-laissez faire inclination of the
RBC literature since its inception. Provided, indeed, that business cycles are
changing-in-time Walrasian equilibria, any counter-cyclical policy is doomed
to distort the optimal allocation of resources, as an immediate result of the
First Welfare Theorem.
4 RBC Theory and Great Depressions World-
wide
The RBC interpretation of the Great Depression outside the USA is made of
two elements. The ﬁrst is a critique of what RBC theorists call the “consen-
26sus view”18, stressing the role of deﬂation and nominal wage stickiness in the
diﬀusion of the depression from the USA to the rest of the world. The basic
idea of the “consensus view” is that adherence to the gold exchange stan-
dard system induced restrictive monetary and ﬁscal policies in the presence
of serious deﬁcits in the balance of trade, or in order to avoid them. These
policies are normally deﬂationary, and deﬂation causes unemployment, un-
less nominal wages decrease. The second element is a case-study analysis
of a number of countries, applying an identical methodology and theoreti-
cal set-up to each country. These studies, it is claimed, demonstrate that
idiosyncratic shocks to TFP and country speciﬁc economic policies provide
a fairly good explanation for the Great Depression in each country, without
any reference to an international dimension.
4.1 The Critique of the “Consensus View”
The arguments presented by Cole et al. (2003) for rejecting the “consensus
view” are empirical and mainly based on the sign of the correlation between
log deviations from the trend-lines of real wages and output, and between
log deviations from the trend-lines of prices and output. According to these
authors, if the “consensus view” were right, there should be a positive corre-
lation between the rates of growth of prices and real output, and a negative
correlation between rates of growth of real wages and real output. In other
words, pinning things down to a traditional labour demand/labour supply
graph, we should observe a north-west movement along the labour demand
schedule, with increasing real wages and decreasing employment.
Studying a cross section data on 17 OECD countries, Cole et al. (2003)
note that when regressions are performed on the cross-sectional average data
for 1929-1932, the correlation between the log deviations of prices and real
output turns out to be -0.08, while the correlation between the log deviations
of real wages and real output is 0.26. This observation leads them to conclude
that the cause of the international Great Depression should not be sought
in a movement along the labour demand curve, but rather in a movement of
the labour demand curve. They then model this hypothesis. They consider
a RBC model with money ` a la Lucas. In their model, the economy can
be hit by two shocks: a monetary shock, causing a movement along the
labour demand curve, and a productivity (TFP) shock which shifts the labour
demand curve. Cole et al. calibrate the parameters of the model so that the
two shocks taken together reproduce as exactly as possible the data set.
18The term “consensus view” is used by Cole et al. (2003) to refer to papers by Bernanke
(1995), Bernanke and Carey (1996) and Eichengreen and Sachs (1985).
27Then they try to ﬁgure out, for diﬀerent orthogonalisations19 between the
two shocks, how much of the movement of the total quantities during the
Great Depression could be explained by each factor. They found that a
country-speciﬁc TFP shock orthogonal to deﬂation could explain 2
3 of output
variation in each country, while monetary shocks explained the remaining 1
3.
Moreover, their artiﬁcial series of TFP shocks matches the few available data
for economy-wide productivity during the 1930s20. On the other hand, the
same simulation carried out with only the monetary shock, that is without
TFP shocks, produces a high negative correlation between real wages and real
output (in log deviation terms), which is at variance with the cross-sectional
evidence.
On the basis of this analysis, Cole et al. (2003) conclude that an RBC
account of the international Great Depression should be based on a shock that
works like a productivity shock, that is orthogonal to deﬂation, and that looks
like a productivity shock in the data. They suggest that natural candidates
for such a shock are the ﬁnancial disruptions stressed by Bernanke (1983),
the decrease in “information capital” hypothesised by Ohanian (2002), and
policy interventions that obstruct the normal working of the market forces,
as in Cole and Ohanian (2001).
The empirical evidence presented by Cole et al. (2003) can be questioned
on several grounds. The 1929-1932 data shows that a positive log deviation
from the trend of real wages is accompanied by a negative log deviation from
the trend of output in 13 countries out of the 17 considered. This means
that, in the vast majority of the observations, the relationship between real
wages and output is negative. True, the interpolation of the plotted data
gives an upward sloping line, with a positive correlation equal to 0.26. But,
ﬁrstly, 0.26 is not a particularly high value. The observations are highly
dispersed in the plot, so that the R2 is necessarily very low. Secondly, con-
sidering that the countries under consideration were substantially diﬀerent
in this periods, the fact that an international increase in the rate of growth
of wages is accompanied by a diminishing rate of decrease in output does
not necessarily mean that, as long as real wages increase in each country, we
should expect real output to increase in that country. Many other factors
which have not been controlled for could inﬂuence the results - for example,
19Two random variables x and y are said to be orthogonal if their cross moment E(x,y)
is zero. In the case under examination, the favoured procedure is one that orthogonalises
the TFP shock on deﬂation. This means that the authors regress TFP on deﬂation, and
then subtract from the actual value of TFP the value obtained by the regression. In this
way the residual TFP will be not correlated with deﬂation, as the eﬀect of deﬂation on
TFP has already been taken into account by means of the regression.
20These data refers to the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia.
28internal political factors (such as the role of unions and of socialist parties),
international political factors (such as war reparations and war debts) and
exchange problems in connection with problems in the balance of trade.
4.2 Case Studies
The case studies analysis is all contained in a special issue of the Review of
Economic Dynamics. I have chosen to focus on four cases, Canada, Germany,
France and United Kingdom, being them methodologically representative
and more interesting as to the Great Depression of the thirties at the same
time21.
4.2.1 Canada
Amaral and MacGee (2002) carried out a comparative analysis of the Great
Depression in Canada and the USA, using a RBC model that is formally
equivalent to that used by Cole and Ohanian (1999). Their principal re-
sult is that an exogenous shock to TFP could reproduce about 50% of the
Canadian depression, and also performs well in accounting for the slow re-
covery. Moreover, building on arguments by Cole and Ohanian (2000), they
exclude the possibility that monetary factors could have played a major role
in causing the Canadian Great Depression. Finally, they test the importance
of terms-of-trade shocks in explaining the depression. During the 1930s,
Canada’s was a small economy where trade constituted a high proportion of
GDP, and trade shocks were certainly appreciable at that time.
The test was done by running a simulation on a two-country RBC set-
up, under the limiting assumption that inputs are non-tradable goods. The
results show that terms-of-trade shocks are unable to account for the Great
Depression in Canada.
The comparison between Canada and the USA is interesting, although
puzzling. It shows, in eﬀect, that, although some similarities in the general
economic trend between the two countries existed, the USA experienced a
recovery starting in 1933, while Canada did not. Such a US recovery was
characterised by a strong TFP recovery. TFP, in eﬀect, was back to its trend
level by 1937 in the USA, while it remained below the trend level throughout
the 1930s in Canada. Interestingly, the time of recovery coincided with the
21For the sake of completeness, the other papers on the issues concern Italy’s mild
depression of the 30s, Japan’s crisis in the 90s and analyses on South-American countries’
depressions in the last decades. I omitted Italy, because the Italian depression was less
signiﬁcative than the others and moreover a bit peculiar (Perri-Quadrini (2002)). I instead
focused on Canada, to compare it with the United States.
29implementation of New Deal policies in the United States, while Canada had
no such policy. On the other hand, while all the aggregate variables suggest
that, starting from 1933, the USA was on the path to recovery while Canada
was not, nevertheless, quite surprisingly, the total hours worked increased
more rapidly in Canada than in the USA in the same time span. Moreover
the trend of measured capital input for the United States was above the
Canadian one.
Amaral and MacGee (2002) try to solve these puzzles by making reference
to Cole and Ohanian (2001); they argue that New Deal policies in the USA
aﬀected labour employment negatively, and therefore, in the USA, measured
TFP (which is a residual) tended to be, ceteris paribus, higher. This expla-
nation seems rather odd. The point is that the GNP of the United States
recovered faster than the GNP of Canada. The diﬀering TFP behaviour can
easily be explained by the diﬀering GNP behaviour, provided that TFP is
normally pro-cyclical. Saying that TFP was higher because employment was
lower could instead conceal some logical pitfalls. Amaral and MacGee (2002)
argue that the USA recovered earlier than Canada, because TFP in the USA
recovered earlier than in Canada. Such a faster recovery, it is argued, did not
create higher employment in the USA than in Canada, because New Deal
policies independently aﬀected the labour market in the USA. So, contrary
to what is expected, Canadian employment recovered earlier than US em-
ployment. But then Amaral and MacGee (2002) point out that the higher
trend of TFP in the USA could depend upon the lower trend in employ-
ment! One might conclude from this odd argument that New Deal policies
were the instrument that dragged the USA economy out of the depression
because, paradoxically, by allowing for higher unemployment, they have al-
lowed for higher TFP, which, in the RBC framework, is the driving force of
the economy. This conclusion clearly indicates that this TFP story does not
withstand close examination.
4.2.2 Germany
While the USA was the epicentre of the Great Depression, Germany was
certainly the European country that experienced the worst depression in
the early 1930s. In their paper analysing the Great Depression in Germany
from a RBC perspective, Fisher and Hornstein (2002) ﬁrstly observe that de-
trended US and German data are quite similar in terms of rates of variation,
so that, in their opinion, the two phenomena are comparable22. Interestingly,
22The authors stress that there are nevertheless some diﬀerences between the depression
in the two countries worth mentioning. The peak of the German cycle was in 1928, while
that of the US cycle was in 1929. Moreover Germany had been “depressed” during the
30Germany recovered to its 1928 trend level in 1937, while the USA was still
depressed at that date. The paper claims that one or more real shocks could
account for the behaviour of the German economy, without any need to
refer to monetary shocks or international constraints. Fisher and Hornstein
(2002) consider three real shocks that seem to them to be in accordance
with the data: real wages, TFP, and ﬁscal policy. Until 1933 Government
policies and union strength caused real wages to increase. In their model,
such an increase in real wages could explain the drop in hours worked per
working-age person. On the other hand, as real wages began to decrease
after 1933, the high-wages hypothesis could not account for the slowness of
the recovery. The “predictive” capacity of the model is improved when ﬁscal
policies (restrictive up to 1932, and very expansive after the seizure of power
by Hitler, and the subsequent high public expenditure on the military) and
exogenous variations in TFP are added to the model. On the other hand,
the model incorporating all three shocks overestimates the magnitude of the
ﬂuctuations. In their conclusions the authors suggest that endogenising TFP
by means of the concept of capacity utilisation could improve the results of
the simulations.
The logic of these results is the usual explanation of a standard RBC
model with government expenditure and distorting taxation. An exogenous
TFP negative shock, together with a deﬂationary ﬁscal policy in the early
1930s, contribute to explaining the onset of deﬂation. The labour demand
curve shifts downwards. Nominal wages rigidities and unions explain the
increase in real wages, and therefore the transformation of deﬂation into
a recession. There is a move along the new labour demand curve. With
the change in the government, and the accession of Hitler to power, ﬁscal
policy becomes expansive, while prices and nominal wages are controlled,
mainly through the abolition of unions. High government expenditure causes
a strong crowding-out eﬀect, with public consumption subtracting resources
from the private sector. This induces an appreciable ”wealth eﬀect”, because
people, feeling poorer, are now willing to work more, which explains the
recovery in production. The labour supply curve shifts rightwards.
4.2.3 France
If the German Great Depression can be cast in a RBC framework, as argued
by Fisher and Hornstein (2002), the French case analysed by Beaudry and
Portier (2002) has proved to be a much harder task. According to what
Beaudry and Portier (2002) deﬁne as “the conventional wisdom”, the Great
whole of the 1920s, while this was certainly not the case for the USA.
31Depression in France was a relatively minor episode, mainly due to mone-
tary factors. France was relatively isolated from the Great Depression until
roughly 1932, thanks to an undervalued French franc. When the UK and
USA left the gold standard and devalued their currencies, in 1931 and 1933
respectively, French production for export started to decrease and precip-
itated France into a recession that was signiﬁcant, although less dramatic
than in other countries. At the trough of the recession the French unem-
ployment rate was about 5%. Deﬂationary policies put into eﬀect by Prime
Minister Laval in 1935 worsened things. The recovery was ﬁnally due to the
devaluation of the franc in 1936, when the Popular Front of leftist parties
won the elections.
Against this view, Beaudry and Portier (2002) note that if we look at
de-trended data, the picture that emerges is quite diﬀerent, and much more
comparable with that depicted by Cole and Ohanian (1999) for the United
States. In terms of de-trended data, the depression in France began in 1930,
and there was no recovery at all: assuming 1929 = 100, de-trended output
in 1939 was 67.5. Moreover there was no acceleration of the depression after
1933. Finally, international trade was a small proportion of output, and for
reasonable values of the elasticities of substitution for intermediate goods,
an international trade shock can only account for a small part of the drop in
output in the model.
Having established the similarity between the French and the US Great
Depressions, Beaudry and Portier (2002) check whether the main explanation
proposed by Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Cole and Ohanian (2001) for
the US Great Depression (namely an exogenous drop in TFP, followed by
distorting economic policies) also works for France in a comparable RBC
model. They ﬁnd that the shock to TFP is not suﬃcient to explain the
magnitude of the de-trended output drop, and that it is even misleading, as
far as the long duration of the depression is concerned. These results are in
line with Cole and Ohanian’s (1999) ﬁndings for the USA. Unlike Cole and
Ohanian (1999), however, Beaudry and Portier (2002) do not consider this
as a good result, and reject the TFP hypothesis.
Unsatisﬁed with the traditional RBC model, Beaudry and Portier (2002)
then examine whether a business cycle model derived from a neo-Schumpeterian
endogenous growth model might do the job better. They simply introduce
the embodiment hypothesis (that is a hypothesis stating that technological
improvement aﬀects only new capital goods, i.e. investments, rather than
the whole capital stock) into the RBC set up, and suppose that the impulse
mechanism of the business cycle is a shock to the input side. Simulations
run under these hypotheses show a much better ﬁt to the data. The ratio-
nale for their result is intuitive. If technological progress is embodied in new
32investment goods, the drop in the investment output ratio will also have an
indirect eﬀect on the rate of technological progress achieved (that is on the
technological progress that is applied to the production of goods and ser-
vices). In this way, a recession caused by a reduction in the use of inputs
will tend to self-replicate.
In order to explain the source of these variations in investments and em-
ployment, Beaudry and Portier (2002) argue in favour of some institutional
change that lowered the steady-state level of total hours worked and of the
capital output ratio. In this respect, following Cole and Ohanian (2001),
they suggest that a likely culprit for the protraction of the depression after
1936 is the formation of a leftist government in 1936 that reduced (by law)
the number of hours worked for a given wage - i.e. increased the rate of
real wages. So, according to Beaudry and Portier (2002), the French depres-
sion was a normal adjustment process to a lower steady-state growth path
induced by institutional modiﬁcations.
4.2.4 United Kingdom
The last case study I consider in this section is the analysis of the Great De-
pression in the United Kingdom from a RBC perspective by Cole and Oha-
nian (2002). In this paper, the authors ﬁrst undertake a growth-accounting
exercise, leading them to exclude the suggestion that a TFP shock could
properly account for the 20-year long depression in the United Kingdom.
De-trended data show, indeed, that both TFP and capital input increased
between 1920 and 1938, while labour input decreased markedly, compared
to the pre-World War I average. Secondly, they argue that Keynes’s (1931)
position on the relationship between exchange rate policy, exports and reces-
sion23 was inconsistent with the available data. They argue that the restric-
tive exchange-rate policy (i.e. the adoption of the gold standard system with
the British pound pegged to it pre-War level) dates to 1925, while, by their
deﬁnitions, the recession began far earlier, in 1919. Moreover, in modern
RBC-style models, monetary shocks do not have a propagation mechanism
strong enough to account for such a long-lasting depression.
Having excluded the monetary origin of the British depression, the au-
thors propose an alternative explanation, based on a series of circumstances
aﬀecting the labour supply. On the one hand, the diminishing competitive-
ness of the British economy in producing some traditional export goods led
23Keynes’s (1931) basic idea is that gold standard constraints forced British policy
makers to adopt a strongly deﬂationary policy, in order to achieve equilibrium in the
balance of trade. This was necessary because the high value of the pound caused diﬃculties
in the export sector.
33to changes in the structure of production, and to a necessary relocation of
the highly concentrated British industrial ﬁrms. On the other hand, the con-
temporaneous adoption of a post-war policy of housing subsidies deterred
households from moving to follow job vacancies, by increasing the opportu-
nity cost of moving. As a third factor, Cole and Ohanian (2002) consider
the existence of a “generous” unemployment beneﬁt scheme. Sticking to
this view, the Great Depression in the United Kingdom can therefore be at-
tributed to contingencies and policies causing a leftward shift in the labour
supply schedule.
4.3 A General Picture
The case-study analyses reviewed above were the ﬁrst attempt to submit the
Great Depression in diﬀerent countries to the same methodological inquiry.
On the one hand, such an attempt might prove useful in providing new in-
sights, so improving our comprehension of the period under examination.
On the other hand, by taking such a wide perspective, RBC theorists de-
parted dramatically from previous work on the subject. Eichengreen (1992)
and other leading historians of the period stress the international dimension
of the Great Depression. By contrast, RBC authors produce a collection of
idiosyncratic analyses within the same methodological framework.
On the basis of the review presented here, the arguments adduced to
support this new approach, as opposed to the accepted historical wisdom,
do not seem robust. While the empirical argument advanced by Cole et al.
(2003) is lacking deﬁnitive evidence, the insights that lead for example Romer
(1993) and Cole and Ohanian (1999) to analyse the USA Great Depression
in a national perspective (i.e. the observation that the USA was an almost
closed economy which experienced a bigger and longer depression than other
countries) do not apply to other countries such as France or Germany.
Nevertheless, these case-study analyses lead to some qualiﬁcations of our
early assessment of the US Great Depression. The two fundamental aspects
we picked out in Section 3 when dealing with the USA, the methodological
and the normative aspect, are recognisable here as well. Yet some diﬀerences
are worth highlighting. Methodologically, there is a clear predominance of
non-historical modelling over historical explanation, yet the demarcation line
between history and economics is not always as clear as in the USA case.
While the analyses of Canada and Germany resort to TFP technology, the
others do not. As far as the normative aspect is concerned, it is even more
accentuated in this stream of the literature than it is in the analysis of the
United States. In Kehoe and Prescott’s (2002) words, the broad message of
the RBC interpretation of the international Great Depression is that
34“[...] government policies that aﬀect TFP and hours per working-
age person are the crucial determinants of the great depressions
of the 20th century” (added emphasis).
This interpretation really follows in the wake of the seminal work by Cole
and Ohanian (1999) focused on the United States. Yet, there is a fundamen-
tal ambiguity concerning the role of economic policy during the 1930s. In
particular, it is not clear whether these authors think that economic policy
worsened a pre-existing negative business cycle (as in the RBC interpretation
of the US Great Depression) or whether economic policy caused the crisis to
occur (as in the passage quoted above from Kehoe and Prescott (2002)). In
this respect, it seems that their normative inclination toward laissez faire
has somehow overcome the rigour of the argument.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have presented a critical review of the RBC interpretation of
the Great Depression. Particular attention has been paid to the methodolog-
ical novelty RBC models of the Great Depression have brought about. As a
matter of fact, before the RBC interpretation saw the light of day, the Great
Depression was considered an insuperable obstacle to the generalised and
unbending application of the neoclassical equilibrium theory. RBC models
on the Great Depression have totally reversed this position, by casting it in
an equilibrium framework.
In view of this methodological focus, in this paper I have ﬁrstly singled
out the methodological premises underlying the RBC approach to the Great
Depression. The RBC interpretation of the Great Depression builds upon
two fundamental hypotheses, which I have deﬁned as the “equilibrium hy-
pothesis” and the “exogenous shock hypothesis”. These assumptions amount
to conceiving business cycles as a sequence of changing Walrasian equilibria
induced by random shocks. In this set-up, the deﬁnition of a recession pe-
riod refers to a negative diﬀerence between the actual rate of growth of the
economy and its trend value. A depression is deﬁned as a big recession, i.e.
one in which output is suddenly and signiﬁcantly lower than its trend value
(Kehoe and Prescott (2002)).
In the light of these deﬁnitions, the previous unanimity on the dating of
the Great Depression has been questioned by RBC authors. According to
them the Great Depression covers the entire decade of the 1930s (Prescott
(1999)), rather than only the strong contraction phase (1929-1932) as tradi-
tionally deﬁned (Eichengreen (1992); Robbins (1934); Temin (1989)). This
change of perspective shifts the nature of the central question to be addressed
35from the onset of the Great Depression to its long duration. In addressing
such a question, RBC authors stick to Lucas’s equilibrium method, pay-
ing great attention to the quantitative dimension of their economic inquiry.
Their typical method of analysis is to build a model economy, to calibrate
the parameters corresponding to the individual objective functions, and to
try to replicate the qualitative behaviour and the descriptive statistics of a
given set of data, after having introduced a suitable exogenous shock.
The initial concern with the USA case, and the demand for simplicity, led
RBC authors to be concerned with a national perspective, paying only slight
attention to the previously much discussed international dimension of the
Great Depression. This allowed me to distinguish, in the review section, the
analysis of the USA Great Depression from the analyses of other countries’
Great Depressions, the two blocks of analyses being independent of each
other.
The general conclusion RBC authors have reached in analysing the Great
Depression is that it was a normal business cycle whose persistence was due
to the distorting intervention of the State, in a vain attempt to improve the
general economic performance. So, while New Deal policies and the like are
traditionally seen as the starting point of the recovery phase, in the RBC in-
terpretation the position is completely reversed. Such economic policies are,
in fact, blamed for having been, not simply ineﬀective, but actually harm-
ful and responsible for the absence of recovery. A strong pro-laissez faire
normative concern characterises the argument here. In particular, such a
normative concern is extremely relevant to the analyses concerning the inter-
national Great Depression, where, for example, Kehoe and Prescott (2002)
go so far as to conclude that economic policies were its cause.
As to methodology, the RBC analysis of the Great Depression could often
be interpreted as drawing a clear border line between the realms of history
and economics, the latter being concerned with building models for data
mimicking, the former with giving an historical content to the black-box cat-
egories used in economics. This methodological feature is particularly obvious
in some leading analyses of the US Great Depression (see Cole and Ohanian
(1999) and Prescott (1999)). In eﬀect, the review presented in Section 3 of
this paper shows that the RBC interpretation of the US Great Depression
should be split into two main tendencies: a RBC proper interpretation, re-
sulting from really analysing the USA Great Depression “through the lens of
neoclassical theory” (Cole and Ohanian (1999)), and a RBC-style interpreta-
tion, methodologically following in the wake of the RBC tradition, but more
involved in a causal analysis. The distinction between history and economics
is much clearer in the ﬁrst stream of the literature than in the second. As to
the international Great Depression, although there is a clear methodological
36preference for modelling over history, the border line is less deﬁnite than in
the USA case. Indeed, the papers reviewed in Section 4 show that, according
to these authors, the origin of the Great Depression in each country should
be sought in some country-speciﬁc shock, the international dimension being
totally dismissed (Cole et al. (2003); Kehoe and Prescott (2002)). This led
in general to more attention being paid to historical factors.
This paper aimed to put the literature in perspective, and did not enter
into an assessment of its methods and conclusions. Yet some general sug-
gestions for future research do emerge from this review. A ﬁrst point worth
a more detailed analysis is the strident contrast between RBC authors and
leading historians as to the role played by international factors during the
Great Depression. As discussed above, the RBC interpretation of the Great
Depression ignores the international dimension. Even when concerned with
the international environment, this literature still adopts a national perspec-
tive. On the contrary, all the historians who have studied the period stress
both the role of international monetary constraints and the role of some
tension-widening socio-political situations, the latter broadly related to the
Russian communist revolution and the consequent emergence of strong leftist
parties (Eichengreen (1992); Hobsbawm (1996)). An in-depth comparison of
the RBC interpretation of the international Great Depression and the work of
leading economic historians could help our understanding of the underlying
reasons for such a big divergence of perspective, and whether it is justiﬁed
or not.
A second intriguing direction for further research concerns the normative
aspect of the RBC interpretation of the Great Depression. The accusation
that New Deal policies delayed the recovery phase reveals a strong inclination
towards laissez faire. This raises the question of whether this interpretation
of the Great Depression is really a novelty, or whether it is, so to say, a case
of old wine in new bottles. To this purpose, a comparison could be drawn
between the ﬁrst laissez faire views of the Great Depression and the RBC
interpretation. Such a comparison could shed some light on important theo-
retical and methodological questions. In particular, it could clarify whether
the RBC analysis can be considered as an attempt to cloak an old idea in new
theoretical tools, or whether the methodological innovation is so important as
to make the RBC interpretation of the Great Depression a new standard. A
comparison between these two broad schemes of interpretation (neoclassical
and new classical) and some heterodox interpretation of the Great Depres-
sion could also be enlightening, insofar as the understanding of how the two
theories diﬀer from the heterodox paradigms might allow the similarities and
diﬀerences between them to be better deﬁned.
Finally, there is the question of whether the “normality assumption”
37makes sense for the analysis of a period like the Great Depression. Under
the equilibrium hypothesis, the normality assumption implies that, during
an economic cycle, a deﬂation process is the re-equilibrating market reaction
to a shock. In other words, under the equilibrium hypothesis, the normality
assumption implies that deﬂation should have led the economy back towards
the stationary equilibrium. The observation that this back-to-trend move-
ment did not seem to happen until the early 1940s leads us to conclude that
a further negative external intervention must have been at work in worsen-
ing things. Hence, the accusation of the New Deal policies. The point is
that the logical premise of this reasoning, i.e. the normality assumption,
seems to be at variance with the general perception of a phenomenon like
the Great Depression. It postulates, indeed, that markets work well, while
most contemporary observers viewed the deﬂation as a clear sign of market
failure (Garratay (1986)). A deﬁnitive assessment of the RBC interpreta-
tion of the Great Depression should therefore start by investigating what a
normal business cycle is, and whether, historically, the Great Depression can
be subsumed under this category. This analysis would lead, I guess, to a
reconsideration of the entire methodological foundations of RBC theory.
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